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ABSTRACT
Sometimes it seems that an existing bearer of value should be preserved even though
it could be destroyed and replaced with something of equal or greater value. How can
this conservative intuition be explained and justified? This paper distinguishes three
answers, which I call existential, attitudinal, and object-affecting conservatism. I raise
some problems for existential and attitudinal conservatism, and suggest how they
can be solved by object-affecting conservatism.
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1. Introduction
Classical utilitarians believe that we can be morally required to end a person’s worth-
while life to create a new life that would be worth living. And ideal utilitarians (for
instance, Moore [1903] and Rashdall [1907]) seem committed to the view that we
can be morally required to destroy beautiful works of art or end loving relationships
whenever doing so would make way for new artworks or relationships that are some-
what better.1
Many would reject these implications of utilitarianism, both classical and ideal. We
have strong reason to preserve valuable lives, artworks, and friendships even when
they can be replaced by substitutes of equal or greater value. These reasons might be
grounded in a more general conservatism about value (see, for instance, Scanlon
[1998: 95, 104], Raz [2001: 161], Scheffler [2007: 106, 2013, 2018], Cohen [2013: ch.
8], Nebel [2015], and Brennan and Hamlin [2016]). But there are many varieties of con-
servatism about value, and these varieties are seldom distinguished from each other.
This paper distinguishes between three kinds of conservatism about value. The var-
ieties of conservatism that I explore differ in their scope—that is, in the range of things
towards which they support a conservative disposition—and in their grounds—that is,
in the reasons why we ought to preserve those kinds of things. The first kind of con-
servatism, proposed by G.A. Cohen, supports a conservative disposition towards
1 This is complicated by the fact that ideal utilitarians can appeal to the value of virtue and say that destroying a
beautiful work of art makes the world worse in terms of this value. Rashdall himself, however, understands virtue
in terms of the value of our motives, and thinks that this value can never make a difference to first-personal
deliberation [Hurka 2014: 174]. Even independently of this, though, it is hard to see why destroying and then
replacing a beautiful object should always be considered vicious, rather than virtuous, if it brings about a
greater balance of (nonmoral) good—especially if the act comes from the motive of promoting the good.
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existing things of intrinsic value: it is grounded in respect for intrinsically valuable
things. The second kind, proposed by Samuel Scheffler, supports a conservative dispo-
sition towards things that we value: it is grounded in the nature of valuing attitudes.
The third kind, proposed here, supports a conservative disposition towards valuable
entities for whom things can be good or bad: it is grounded in our reasons for
concern about their good.
2. Existential Conservatism
This section explores Cohen’s conservatism. He argues that we have reason to preserve
any existing thing with a certain kind of value. I call this existential conservatism.
Cohen [2013: 144] restricts his conservatism to bearers of ‘intrinsic value’, by which
he means ‘the value that something has in itself, independently of its consequences’.
Many philosophers, though, distinguish between the value that something has in
itself, in virtue of its intrinsic properties, and the value that something has indepen-
dently of its consequences [Smith 1948; Korsgaard 1983]. Princess Diana’s dress
might be noninstrumentally valuable—that is, valuable independently of its conse-
quences—in virtue of its relation to Princess Diana, and therefore extrinsically [Rabi-
nowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2003]. It’s worth framing Cohen’s conservatism in a
way that respects this distinction.
Which kind of value, intrinsic or noninstrumental, really matters for existential
conservatism? Intuitively, we have reason to preserve Princess Diana’s dress even if
it could be replaced by something of equal or greater value. This suggests that nonin-
strumental value is what matters for existential conservatism.2 I therefore state Cohen’s
conservatism as follows:
Existential Conservatism. If an existing thing is noninstrumentally valuable, then we have
reason to preserve it, even when it can be replaced by something of equal or greater value.3
Another reason to focus on noninstrumental value, rather than intrinsic value, has
to do with the grounds for Cohen’s conservatism. He argues [2013: 153] that, if we lack
a conservative disposition towards existing things of noninstrumental value, we treat
these things as having merely instrumental value:
If an existing thing has intrinsic value, then we have reason to regret its destruction as such, a
reason that we would not have if we cared only about the value that the thing carries or instanti-
ates.… [I]t is rational and right to have such a bias in favor of existing value, that, for example,
if you happily replace a fine statue by a merely somewhat better one, the production of which
requires destruction of the original statue, then you mistreat the now destroyed work as (so to
speak) having had the merely instrumental value of being a vessel of aesthetic value.
According to Cohen, the problem with anticonservative trade-offs, in which we replace
an existing thing of value for an arbitrarily small gain in value, is that they
2 Frick [2017] also interprets Cohen’s conservatism as a claim about noninstrumental value. This seems to answer
at least one of Matthes’s [2013] objections to Cohen’s conservatism—namely, that it cannot account for see-
mingly irreplaceable bearers of extrinsic value.
3 I am using the mass noun reason in the ‘pro tanto’ sense, so that we can have reason to do something even if
it’s not the case that we ought to do it (and even if we ought not to do it). This doesn’t necessarily imply that
there is some fact that is the reason to do it (for discussion of the mass- and count-noun uses of reason, and of
how they relate to each other, see Fogal [2016]). But I take it that, on Cohen’s view, the features that make some-
thing noninstrumentally valuable explain why we have reason to preserve it, and might thus be said to be the
reasons to preserve it.
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instrumentalise valuable things. This is most clearly wrong when and because the value
instantiated is noninstrumental.
Cohen’s distinction between caring about value and caring about its bearer is
important. Compare his idea to a view sometimes attributed to Plato (for example,
by Vlastos [1999]). In the Symposium, Diotima argues that the beauty of one beautiful
person is the same as the beauty of another, and that beauty itself—rather than beau-
tiful people—is therefore the fitting object of love. This view would have us care pri-
marily about an abstract universal rather than the individuals that instantiate it. On
Cohen’s view, that is a mistake: we shouldn’t only, or even primarily, care about the
beauty or value of an individual; we should instead care about the individual.
Why is it a mistake to care only about value rather than its bearer? If we care only
about a thing’s value, then (according to Cohen) we care about it merely as a means to
the promotion of value, to keeping ‘the value rating high’ [2013: 153]. But if something
is noninstrumentally valuable, then we shouldn’t care about it merely as a means to
anything else. More generally, we have reason to ‘[t]reat everything as having the
profile of value it has’ [Nozick 1981: 522]. Treating something as having the profile
of value that it has means not only treating it as having the amount or degree of
value that it has, but, more importantly, responding appropriately to the kind of
value that it has. If something has noninstrumental value, then caring about it
merely as a means to the promotion of value fails to treat it as having the profile of
value that it has. As Nozick puts it, ‘In responding to someone else’s value, we act
for his sake—not just the value’s sake’ [ibid.: 529]. This is because a person is valuable
for his or her own sake.
I agree with Cohen that we shouldn’t care about noninstrumentally valuable things
merely for the sake of their value. But that’s not enough to justify existential conserva-
tism. If our proper object of concern were value itself, rather than its bearer, then antic-
onservative trade-offs would be justified. But it doesn’t follow that, because our proper
object of concern is not value itself but rather its bearer, anticonservative trade-offs are
unjustified.
Consider a manifestly instrumental value: money. Suppose that you see a $10 bill on
the footpath. When you pick it up, a $10 bill from your own pocket flies away and lands
in the hands of the stranger who dropped the first bill. Neither you nor the stranger has
any reason for regret. This is because a $10 bill is valuable merely as a means, not for its
own sake. Anticonservative trade-offs with respect to money are justified because
money has merely instrumental value [Chappell 2015].
Consider, next, Princess Diana’s dress, which (we suppose) has noninstrumental
value. Suppose that you value the dress noninstrumentally because of its relation to
Princess Diana. Suppose that you lose this dress in the process of acquiring a new
one that is noninstrumentally valuable in the same way, and to the same degree: it,
too, was Princess Diana’s. It is not obvious that you have stronger reason for regret
than you would have if both dresses were of merely instrumental value. Accepting
the replacement need not be driven by an inappropriate concern merely for the
value of the object. I am therefore not convinced that existential conservatism can
be justified merely by pointing out that we shouldn’t care about noninstrumentally
valuable things only for their value.
That’s not to say that existential conservatism cannot be justified. But its justifica-
tion would have to involve some reason why respect for noninstrumentally valuable
things requires or supports a conservative disposition—that is, why a willingness to
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make anticonservative trade-offs treats noninstrumentally valuable things as having
merely instrumental value, and so fails to treat things as having the kind of value
that they have.
Cohen’s suggested connection between respect and preservation has to do with our
reasons to regret the loss or destruction of valuable things. He suggests that we have
reason to regret the loss of valuable things as such, not for the loss of their value.
That’s plausible enough. But we might have wanted an explanation for this. It is
clear why we should regret the loss of value if we have reason to care about the pro-
motion of value. But what are our reasons for regretting the loss of a valuable thing
over and above the loss of its value?
Cohen might deny the need for an explanation by claiming that his existential con-
servatism is basic. But we sometimes lack any reason to prevent the loss of valuable
things. Consider ephemeral objects like sandcastles and chalk drawings on city foot-
paths. We might have reason for regret when these things disappear. But we don’t
have reason to preserve them for as long as possible. This might be because it’s in
their nature to change and disappear. (Cohen says this about bonfires and shooting
stars.) Even if we could somehow preserve these things forever, though, I don’t
think that we would have reason to do so.
Perhaps this is because the eternal existence of such a thing does not preserve the
valuable thing as it is, but instead destroys it or makes it less valuable. (Shiffrin
[2013] suggests this about events like conversations and musical performances.) The
value of a footpath drawing or sandcastle might consist partly in its mutability and
eventual disappearance. But this doesn’t seem to capture Cohen’s concern for valuable
things for their own sakes. If we allow an object to disappear because maintaining it
would make it less valuable, then we seem to care primarily about the value of the
object, not about the object itself. We treat it as ‘having had the merely instrumental
value of being a vessel of aesthetic value’ [Cohen 2013: 153]. And even if maintaining
an object of this kind made it no less valuable, but instead had no effect on its value, I
don’t think that we would have conservative reason to maintain it. Reducing the value
of the object doesn’t seem a complete explanation for why we lack reason to preserve it.
In other cases, we might have reason to preserve something of noninstrumental
value, although not when its preservation crowds out a better replacement. Consider
sensory pleasure. A pleasurable sensation is, plausibly, good independently of its con-
sequences. It’s not valuable merely as means to some other good. Suppose that you are
undergoing some pleasurable sensation, so that it is an existing thing of value. Do you
have any reason to preserve this sensation indefinitely even if it could be replaced by
one that feels better? No. Even if the new sensation would feel only slightly better, you
would have most reason to choose the better one. (That’s not to say that all pleasures
are intersubstitutable. We wouldn’t welcome an abrupt end to our taking pleasure in
our children’s accomplishments in order to take even more pleasure in a nice meal.
That would be an inappropriate response to the value of our children or of their
accomplishments. We bracket these complications by considering purely sensory plea-
sures that are not responses to independently valuable objects.)
A final problem for existential conservatism involves valuable things that are lost or
changed but can be restored. We would have reason to recover the second book of
Aristotle’s Poetics if we could. Existential conservatism gives us no such reason.
Perhaps that, by itself, is no objection to existential conservatism. Maybe the
reasons to recover the second book of the Poetics would have nothing to do with
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conservatism of any kind (although I doubt that). Further problems, though, arise
when existing things of value are replaced. Suppose that we discover a fake second
book of the Poetics, written not by Aristotle but by Averröes. This book might have
noninstrumental value, so that, according to existential conservatism, we have
reason to preserve it. But if we could destroy it and replace it with the lost book
written by Aristotle, I think that we would have reason to do so. Our loyalty should
lie with the original, not the counterfeit.
Or consider one of Cohen’s favourite examples of things worth preserving—All
Souls College. Suppose that All Souls accepts external funding, admits undergraduates,
hosts kindergarten birthday parties, becomes a Christian Rock record label, and
changes radically in other ways. But suppose that, just after making these changes,
we can reverse them. Surely Cohen would support the reversal. Existential conserva-
tism, though, says that we have some reason to preserve the existing nature of All
Souls (assuming that it retains some noninstrumental value). It says nothing in
favour of restoring its original nature. That’s not a conservative conclusion. There
could be some independent principle that gives us reason to restore its original
nature. But we might have wanted a plausible conservative principle to give us some
reason to restore the original nature and no reason to preserve its new nature.
We have seen a few problems for existential conservatism. It seems not to explain
why we should regret the loss of a valuable thing over and above the loss of its value. It
wrongly predicts that we have reason to preserve fleeting phenomena and mere
sensory pleasures. And it runs counter to conservative convictions about the restor-
ation of valuable things. These problems are not decisive objections. But, other
things being equal, we should prefer a view that can solve these problems.
3. Attitudinal Conservatism
The second kind of conservatism is due to Scheffler [2007, 2013, 2018]. He argues that
we have reason to preserve valuable things that we value. Because this reason depends
on our attitudes towards valuable things, I call it attitudinal conservatism.
Here is a simple way of understanding attitudinal conservatism. Valuing something
involves seeing oneself as having reasons to respond to it in certain ways [Scheffler
2010: ch. 1]. These responses include conservative ones, like cherishing and preserving.
If we value something valuable, then we don’t just see ourselves as having reasons for
conservative responses; we also have such reasons. So, if we value something that is
valuable, then we have reason to preserve it.4 Thus:
Attitudinal Conservatism. If we value something worth valuing, then we have reason to pre-
serve it, even when it can be replaced by something of equal or greater value.
On this view, our conservative reasons depend, at least in part, on our valuing atti-
tudes. There might be things worth valuing that we don’t value. On Scheffler’s view,
we ourselves lack reason to preserve these things. We would have reason to preserve
them if we valued them. But, Scheffler believes, we are under no general obligation
to care about every valuable thing.
4 Just as something can be valuable either instrumentally or noninstrumentally, we can value a thing either
instrumentally or noninstrumentally. I assume that Scheffler has in mind both noninstrumental value and non-
instrumental valuing.
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Attitudinal conservatism’s focus on valuing seems to support a conservative bias
towards presently existing things. Scheffler [2018] argues that valuing involves an
attachment to what’s valued, that attachment requires acquaintance, and that we can
only be acquainted with things that exist. So, we cannot value a not-yet-existing sub-
stitute for an object that we value. This can explain why we have reason to preserve
valued existing things even when they can be replaced by no-less-valuable things:
even if we would value the replacement as much as we value the existing object, we
cannot now value the replacement.
Attitudinal conservatism avoids the mistake that Cohen attributes to anticonserva-
tives. We value the object, not its value. So, we correctly see ourselves as having reason
to preserve the object. Our conservative responses, on this view, are responses to the
valued object itself, not to the value that it instantiates.
Attitudinal conservatism can perhaps solve the problems that we saw for existential
conservatism. First, existential conservatism seems to lack an informative account of
why we should regret the loss of a valuable thing over and above the loss of its
value. Attitudinal conservatism suggests a simple account of why we should regret
the loss of a thing that we fittingly value, over and above the loss of its value. We
should regret its loss because we are, or were, rightly attached to it, and we reasonably
regret the loss of things to which we are attached.
Second, we lack reason to preserve fleeting phenomena, whose value partly con-
sists in their ephemeral nature. Suppose that we value a beautiful footpath drawing.
Because we are attached to the drawing, we might lament its disappearance. But we
don’t have reason to ensure that it exists forever. This might be grounded in facts
about the distinctive way in which we value the object: we value it partly because
of its mutability and eventual disappearance. Since the ways in which we see our-
selves as having reason to respond to an object depend on the way in which we
value the object, we needn’t see ourselves as having reason to prevent its inevitable
change and disappearance.
Third, we lack conservative dispositions towards mere sensory pleasures. Attitudi-
nal conservatism might not apply to mere sensory pleasures: even though such plea-
sures are valuable, we don’t value them in the robust way that we value projects,
relationships, artwork, and even other people. We might want to experience such plea-
sures. But we are not attached or emotionally vulnerable to them, in the ways that we
are to the things that we paradigmatically have reason to preserve.
Even if we do value mere sensory pleasures, the attitudinal conservative might claim
that that we value them only qua sensations of a certain type, instead of valuing the
token sensations themselves. This kind of valuing seems to be an appropriate response,
because the value of a pleasurable experience seems to derive from the value of a type
that it instantiates. And we might have conservative dispositions towards the type, if
not its tokens. For example, if people lost the capacity to experience sexual pleasure
but were better able to experience intellectual pleasure, this loss would be regrettable
as such, not merely for its accompanying loss of value. However we individuate plea-
sures, it seems reasonable to hope that people will continue to feel good in the particu-
lar ways that we can feel good, even if the loss of those capacities allows people to feel
even better overall.
If we do not value sensory pleasures, or if we value them qua type rather than qua
token, then we can explain our willingness to upgrade our pleasurable sensations: we
have attachment, not to this particular experience, but rather to the kind of experience
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it is. So, attitudinal conservatism does not support an implausibly conservative dispo-
sition towards token pleasurable sensations.
The final problem that we saw for existential conservatism concerned the restor-
ation of valuable things. If something valuable is lost and replaced, existential conser-
vatism says that we have reason to preserve the replacement, and cannot explain why
we have reason to recover the original. According to attitudinal conservatism,
however, we might have no reason to preserve the replacement if we don’t yet value
it. It takes time and engagement to grow attached to something. And we might have
reason to recover the original, because we might remain attached to it or (if we
cannot be attached to things that no longer exist) to our memory of it. Of course, as
we grow attached to the replacement and lose our attachment to the original, we
might acquire reason to preserve the replacement and lose reason to restore the orig-
inal. But that’s to be expected: it is implausible that we should forever remain loyal to
what we initially valued, no matter how much we, they, and other things have changed.
Although I find attitudinal conservatism more plausible than existential conserva-
tism, it faces some important problems.
Attitudinal conservatism seems, in some ways, incomplete: it cannot capture all
that we might have wanted from a conservative principle. It supports our conserva-
tive disposition only to things that we value. But, intuitively, we can have conserva-
tive reasons to preserve things that we ourselves don’t value. For example, I don’t
value opera, Christianity, your children, or Slavic literature. But I have some
reason to preserve these things. It would be wrong of me to allow their destruction,
if I could easily prevent it, even if their destruction would make way for things that I
do value.
Maybe there’s some independent principle that gives us reason to preserve things
valued by others. For example, if the loss of something that you value is bad for
you, then I allow you to be harmed in allowing the destruction of something that
you value. And I have independent reason not to allow you to be harmed.
There might, however, be things that no one values but whose destruction we have
reason to prevent. We would have reason to prevent the destruction of great works of
art or ecosystems even if their value were unrecognised and unappreciated. Perhaps
that’s because we ought to value such things. But if no one actually values them,
then no one is harmed by their destruction—at least, as far as attitudinal conservatism
is concerned.
Moreover, creating new things that we value can be good for us. Our lives can be
enriched by forming new attachments. If the loss of something that you value would
make way for something else that you would value even more, then the loss would
be bad for you, but the replacement might ultimately be good for you. Suppose that
this process would be just barely good for you overall. It seems to me that I should
still prevent the destruction of what you value, if I can easily prevent it and if the repla-
cement would be just barely good for you. I have the same reasons as you have to pre-
serve things tha tyou value. But that can’t be explained by the badness for you, since the
loss and replacement would be better for you overall.
Further problems arise when we consider the relation between valuing and acquain-
tance. Valuing something is supposed to require acquaintance with that thing. This
acquaintance requirement is supposed to explain why we cannot value the prospective
replacement of something that we value: we are not acquainted with things that don’t
yet exist.
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The requirement of acquaintance, however, might be too strong. Many of us value
things in, or aspects of, the past. These might include things with which we are not or
have never been acquainted—for example, distinctive and admirable features of one’s
heritage. If acquaintance with something at a time requires it to exist at that time, then
we cannot currently be acquainted with things that no longer exist. Perhaps we remain
attached, not to things in the past or to the past itself, but rather to our memories or
thoughts of those things. But this makes it hard to see why we have reason to restore
things that we used to value. If we cannot value the thing itself, but only some mental
representation of it, then why do we have reason to restore the thing?
Whatever the answer to this question is, it runs the risk of undermining attitudinal
conservatism’s intuitive asymmetry between past and future. Just as we can value our
thoughts of the past, we can value our thoughts of the future. But if our valuing mere
thoughts of the past were enough to generate reasons to restore things, then our
valuing mere thoughts of the future should be enough to generate reasons to bring
those thoughts to fruition. It is therefore hard to see why we would have reason to
restore something valued that we recently lost, rather than to create a new thing.
There might be relevant differences between our thoughts of the past and our
thoughts of the future. We tend not to imagine the future in as much detail as that
with which we remember the past. And it’s harder to imagine the future correctly
than it is to recall the past correctly. Perhaps such differences account for the distinct
evaluative responses that we have towards the past and the future. But there are other
problems for the requirement of acquaintance.
Consider things that presently exist but are spatially remote, like other planets, or
patches of wilderness that have never been touched by humans. If valuing requires
acquaintance, then we cannot value these things. But even if that’s true, we nonetheless
have reason to preserve these things, if we can, even if their destruction would make
way for more beautiful planets or patches of wilderness. Attitudinal conservatism
seems unable to account for such reasons.
I have focused on various ways in which attitudinal conservatism seems incomplete:
it faces challenges in explaining why we have reason to preserve things that we our-
selves don’t value, things that no one values but ought to be valued, things that we
used to value, and things that are too far away to value. More generally, there seem
to be reasons to preserve valuable things that do not depend on our valuing them.
We’ll now consider a new kind of conservatism, one that avoids these difficulties.
4. Object-Affecting Conservatism
To introduce our third variety of conservatism, I want to return to Cohen’s diagnosis
of the anticonservative mistake. In section 1, I agreed with Cohen that it’s a mistake to
care about value rather than its bearer. I now want to explain why I think that’s a
mistake.
I think that it’s a mistake about what value is. The mistake is made by impersonal
conceptions of value, the paradigm example of which is due to Moore [1903]. On a
Moorean view, goodness is a simple property that can be instantiated in people’s
lives, among other locations [Regan 2004]. What we call ‘our own good’ is just this
property instantiated in our own lives. We have reason to care about each other’s
lives because we have reason to desire and promote the good wherever it is.
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On a Moorean conception of value, goodness is, in some ways, relevantly like phys-
ical quantities—for instance, mass. Two objects with the same mass instantiate the very
same determinate quantity. So, if we replace something of 3 grams with another object
of 3 grams, there’s no loss of mass. OnMoore’s view, two things of equal value instanti-
ate the very same quantity of good. So, if we replace something with an equally valuable
substitute, there’s no loss of good.
If we were mere containers of impersonal good, then anticonservative trade-offs
would be easily justified: they would be mere substitutions of some containers for
others. Indeed, it would seem wrong not to replace one container for another, if the
replacement would contain more good.
But this conception of value strikes me as deeply unattractive. Value isn’t like
mass: people (and other valuable things) are not merely locations where some
quantity—good—is instantiated. Our reasons to care about our and each other’s
lives are not explained by the fact that this quantity just happens to be instantiated
in our and each other’s lives. As Cohen [2013: 164] puts it, we are not mere ‘vessels
of value’.5
If, however, value is not some impersonal quantity, then what is it? I think that there
are many kinds of value. Two are relevant for my purposes here.
The first species of value with which I am concerned is a kind of status, and so I call
it status-value. This kind of value most plausibly applies to people—for instance, when
Kantians say that people have dignity, rather than price [Parfit 2011: sec. 70]. Status-
value is not a kind of goodness or desirability. It is not an object of desire, or a quantity
to be promoted. People are status-valuable, in the sense that they are worth caring
about for their own sakes.6 People are worth caring about for their own sakes, in the
sense that they themselves (as opposed to their causal contributions to valuable
states of affairs) are the sources of reasons to care about them, and this is to be
reflected in the way in which we care about them.
Which things have status-value? There is room for reasonable disagreement here.
On one view, only people and perhaps other sentient beings are status-valuable. On
a broader view, many other things—for example, works of art, relationships, and other
living things—might also be status-valuable. That would be true if they are worth
caring about for their own sakes, not merely for the sake of the people who enjoy,
create, participate in, or otherwise benefit from these things. I am inclined to think
that these and many other things have status-value. But I don’t insist on this; we’ll
soon see how the choice between these different views is relevant to the scope of my
proposed conservatism.
The second species of value with which I am concerned is a kind of goodness. It is a
property of states of affairs, but it’s not impersonal. It is the good of a person or other
entity. Things can go more, or less, well for a person. This kind of value might be a
quantity, in some sense: it is a determinable property that might, on certain views
about well-being, have a quantitative structure. And a person’s good is worth promot-
ing, in that we have reason to make people better off. But each person’s good is a
5 Although, as I suggest elsewhere [2019b], some of our deepest moral convictions might reveal that we do
regard people in this way.
6 On caring, see Jaworska [2007] and Seidman [2009]. On for-someone’s-sake attitudes, see Rønnow-Rasmussen
[2011: ch. 5].
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distinct quantity; different people’s good cannot be ‘fused’ together to form the good of
a single person or other whole [Rawls 1999: 24].7
Which things have a good, other than people? Again, there is room for reasonable
disagreement here. On one view, only people and other sentient beings have a good.
This view seems too restrictive. It seems good for a plant for it to have water and sun-
light. On a broader view (due to Kraut [2007]), things can be good for nonsentient living
things (for instance, by being conducive to their health) as well as artifacts and purpose-
ful activities (for instance, by enhancing their ability to achieve their purpose).8 We
might also judge things to be good for natural kinds more generally, by making them
better specimens of their kinds.9 On an even broader view (due to Thomson [1997]),
things can be good for arbitrary inanimate objects: the good of an inanimate object
that is not an artifact is, for Thomson, determined by the wants of human beings.
(This does not entail that such an object can only be valuable, or worth caring about,
because of its contribution to the wants of human beings.) I prefer these broader
views, but again I don’t insist on them.
These two species of value relate in the following way: if something is status-valu-
able—that is, worth caring about for its own sake—then we have reason to want things
to go better rather than worse for it.10 This doesn’t mean that our emotions must
always be sensitive to fluctuations in its good, or that we must always do whatever
we can to make it better off. But we have some reason to prefer, in some dispositional
way, that things go well rather than badly for it. We should not be indifferent to the
good of things that are worth caring about for their own sakes.
The distinction between status-value and the good of a person or other entity is
probably too simple to capture all varieties of value. But it might help to justify a
kind of conservatism:
Object-Affecting Conservatism. If a thing has status-value, then we have reason to preserve it
when and because its preservation is good for it—even when it can be replaced by some-
thing that is no less worth caring about for its own sake.
This kind of conservatism is object-affecting in the sense that it grounds our reasons to
preserve an object in what is good for that object.
Object-affecting conservatism supports a conservative disposition only towards
things that have status-value. Some entities for whom things can go well or badly
lack status-value. Things can go well or badly for the Nazi Party, but we don’t have
reason to want things to go better for the Nazi Party. The Nazi Party is not worth
caring about for its own sake. So, object-affecting conservatism does not support the
preservation of the Nazi Party, even if the party’s preservation would be good for it.
Object-affecting conservatism supports the preservation of a thing only when the
thing would be better off being preserved. This is most plausible in the case of
people. But it also seems plausible for other kinds of things that are worth caring
about for their own sake. Just as it is bad for an ecosystem to dump radioactive
7 This doesn’t entail incomparability between different people’s good, any more than the distinctness of a
person’s height and width entail the incomparability of those dimensions.
8 For critique, see Rosati [2009] and Behrends [2011].
9 Even Sumner [1992: 8] is ‘prepared to think that mountains and stars can fare better or worse on some objec-
tive scale of perfection’; he just doubts that we have any reasons to want them to fare better, since they lack a
point of view.
10 Frick [2020] makes a related claim about his ‘bearer-regarding’ and ‘state-regarding’ senses of ‘mattering’.
10 JACOB M. NEBEL
waste in it, it is even worse for that ecosystem to bulldoze it in order to build some new
facility. Just as it is bad for a sculpture to chip at its parts, it is even worse for that sculp-
ture if its material is ground up and reappropriated. Just as it is bad for a friendship to
break a promise to one’s friend, it is even worse for that friendship if it is ended
altogether. These claims might be derived from one of the views, mentioned earlier,
about what is good for things of these kinds. But we might also find these claims plaus-
ible independently of any such theory: bulldozing an ecosystem seems bad for that eco-
system, destroying a sculpture seems bad for that sculpture, and ending a friendship
seems bad for that friendship.
It might, however, be unclear why we have reason to preserve such things when they
could be replaced by things that have no less status-value. But this can be explained by
a principle that many philosophers independently accept—namely, that it cannot be
better for a person to be brought into existence than never to exist at all [Broome
1993; Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson 2005; McMahan 2013]. On some views,
that is because, if she never existed, then there would have been no her for whom
her existence would have been worse.11 This kind of reasoning is not specific to
persons. It applies to anything that can be affected for better or for worse. This
means that promoting the good of status-valuable things—that is, of things whose
good is worth caring about for its own sake—gives us no reason to bring more of
such things into existence.
Some might object that if existence cannot be better than nonexistence for a thing,
then we would never have reason, according to object-affecting conservatism, to pre-
serve things. But consider the life of a person. An existing person can be better off if she
continues to live than if she dies, because her life as a whole will be better if she con-
tinues to live. We have reason to prefer, for her sake, that she lives a better life. The
badness of death does not, on many views, rely on comparing the badness of nonexis-
tence at some time with the goodness of existence at that same time [Nagel 1970;
Feldman 1991; McMahan 1988; Broome 1993]. Instead, it involves (at least in part)
a comparison between different possible lives extended through time. Similarly, a
friendship can be better off if continued rather than ended—not because the friendship
is badly off at times when it doesn’t exist, but rather because the temporally extended
friendship is better if longer.
I hope that I have said enough to motivate the basic idea of object-affecting conser-
vatism. I now want to see whether it avoids the problems for existential and attitudinal
conservatism.
Let’s begin with the problems for existential conservatism. The first problem was the
lack of an informative explanation for why we should regret the loss of a valuable thing
over and above the loss of its value. Object-affecting conservatism can explain this: we
should regret the loss of a status-valuable thing when and because its continued exist-
ence is better for it than its loss. There might be some sense in which we regret the loss
of its value: we regret a loss of value for the thing. But that is not the kind of lost value to
which anticonservatives appeal. We do not gain it back by replacing the original object.
The second problem concerned the preservation of fleeting phenomena, like foot-
path drawings. If we can make sense of things being better or worse for a drawing or
11 That is the reasoning of the authors cited in the previous sentence. For critique, see Arrhenius and Rabinowicz
[2015] and Nebel [2019b]. Elsewhere [2019a], I offer a different view, on which it still cannot be better for
someone to exist.
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another inanimate object, then object-affecting conservatism can avoid this problem.
And I think that we can make sense of such things. For example, it might be bad for a
footpath drawing if it is erased prematurely, before the artist intends it to fade. It
might be good for it if it lasts a long time. But it might not be good for it for it to be pre-
served indefinitely. These claims might be true if the good of a work of art depends on the
artist’s intentions about that work, or on the properties that make it aesthetically valuable
(which, for footpath drawings, might include their eventual disappearance).
Similar claims might hold for musical performances, conversations, bonfires, super-
novae, and—on some views—even lives. Let’s suppose that all of these things have
status-value: their value does not consist merely in their value for the people who
witness or participate in them. On this view, we have reason to care about this very
performance or this very conversation for its own sake. Now, it might be bad for
these things to be cut short prematurely—that is, before the intended end of the
song, or before the aim of the conversation was achieved. And we might have
reason to prevent their premature ending even if being cut short is necessary for start-
ing some new performance or conversation. But we might have no reason to prolong a
performance or conversation beyond its proper end, because doing so is not good for
(and indeed might be bad for) the performance or conversation.12
If you prefer a narrower view of which things have a good, then you might doubt
that many of these ephemeral objects or events have a good at all. In that case, you
might still accept object-affecting conservatism. After all, the problem for existential
conservatism was that it supported a disposition to preserve these things that should
not be preserved. So, it would be no objection to object-affecting conservatism if it
could not ground a special reason to preserve these things.
Consider, next, the third problem for existential conservatism, concerning pleasure.
We lack reason to preserve a pleasurable sensation when it could be replaced by an
even more pleasurable one. Object-affecting conservatism can avoid this problem
because pleasure, quite plausibly, lacks status-value. It is worth caring about, not for
its own sake, but rather for the sake of the person who experiences it. It is good for
people, but it does not have a good that is itself worth caring about. Pleasure is, there-
fore, unlike people and other things towards which we have a conservative disposition.
The case of pleasure highlights the importance of distinguishing between our
different varieties of value. Although pleasure is not worth caring about for its (plea-
sure’s) sake, it is good for its own sake, rather than for the sake of something else
that it causally promotes. It is good for its own sake in the sense that it is worth
wanting as an end to be brought about, not merely as a means to something else.
But this doesn’t mean that it has either status-value or impersonal value. It lacks
status-value because, as we saw in section 2, pleasure is not something that we value
in the robust way that we value projects, relationships, artwork, and even other
people. And, arguably, it is not impersonally valuable because pleasure is good for
its own sake—that is, noninstrumentally—only for the sake of whoever experiences
it.13 We want there to be pleasure, not because pleasure makes the world better, but
rather because it is good for people: people are not mere containers of valuable
12 This point is in some ways similar to Shiffrin’s [2013] suggestion about the reduced value of the item. But my
point is about the reduction of value for the item, not the reduction in value of the item.
13 The case for this double for-the-sake-of qualification regarding noninstrumental personal value (although not
specifically regarding pleasure) is made by Rønnow-Rasmussen [2011: ch. 5].
12 JACOB M. NEBEL
experiences. This does not, however, mean that the goodness of pleasure is merely
instrumental: some things, like pleasure, are noninstrumentally good for people.
The final problem for existential conservatism had to do with restoration. When
something of value is lost and replaced, our conservative allegiance does not immedi-
ately shift towards the replacement. We have reason to restore the original thing. The
implications of object-affecting conservatism for this issue are complicated, like the
issue itself. It might imply that we have reason to restore the original object, if its
resumed existence would serve it well. But if the replacement is also worth caring
about for its own sake, then we might also have some reason not to destroy it in
order to restore the original. What we have most reason to do probably depends on
the case. Averröes’s counterfeit might be less worth caring about for its own sake
than Aristotle’s original. The cheesy dystopian future of All Souls is less worth
caring about for its own sake than its original nature is. So, in these cases, we plausibly
ought to restore the original. But there might be other cases in which we have sufficient
reason not to restore the original, or even decisive reason to preserve the successor.
(Perhaps some things are better off dead or forgotten.)
Those are the four problems that we saw for existential conservatism. Object-
affecting conservatism, I think, can avoid these problems.
Object-affecting conservatism also avoids the problems for attitudinal conserva-
tism. Those problems had to do with our conservative responses towards things that
we ourselves don’t value, things that no one values but that ought to be valued,
things we used to value, and things that are too far away to value. Object-affecting con-
servatism can support these responses because it doesn’t require any sort of valuing
connection or acquaintance between us and what we have reason to preserve.
Again, if you have a narrower view of which things have a good, or which things are
worth caring about for their own sakes, then object-affecting conservatism might have
(on your view) more limited scope. If you also believe that things beyond that scope
ought to be preserved even when they could be replaced by similar things of equal
or greater value, then you might regard object-affecting conservatism as insufficient
to explain our conservative convictions. Since object-affecting conservatism states
only a sufficient condition for our reasons to preserve valuable things, this would
not, by itself, give us reason to reject object-affecting conservatism. One possibility
is that, in addition to object-affecting conservatism, some additional conservative prin-
ciple is also true, such as attitudinal conservatism. (After all, our problems for attitu-
dinal conservatism were ways in which it seemed incomplete or too weak: we can have
reason to preserve things that we don’t value.) Another possibility is that our conser-
vative dispositions with respect to objects beyond this limited scope cannot be justified.
This would remove some of the motivation for preferring object-affecting conserva-
tism to existential conservatism, since some of our objections to the latter focused
on things beyond that limited scope. But not all of our objections did: we saw existen-
tial conservatism to be, in other ways, too strong (for example, in supporting a conser-
vative disposition towards mere sensory pleasures). A third possibility is that object-
affecting conservatism is false. I do not insist that it is true. But it seems to me a
view worthy of consideration, even if its plausibility and explanatory power depend
on the answers to these other big open questions: which things are worth valuing
for their own sakes, and which things have a good?14
14 I am grateful to Samuel Scheffler and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.
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